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EXAMPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN) 
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Eduard V. Krasnov2
Abstract: This paper discusses 
conceptual and applied issues regarding 
the agreements between the federal 
centre and the subjects of the Russian 
Federation on the division of jurisdiction 
and powers. The paper reveals the 
historical background and reasons for the 
emergence of this legal institution, its 
consolidation in the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation and the Constitution 
of Tatarstan, the evolution of current 
domestic legislation, as well as the 
practice of applying the above 
institution. It is indicated that the 
distinction between objects of 
jurisdiction and authority is an integral 
element of the principle of federalism, 
which is one of the foundations of the 
state system of the Russian Federation. 
Also, the paper provides an extensive 
historical retrospective of the evolution 
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of state and legal relations between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Tatarstan. In many ways, it was the 
experience of these relationships that 
influenced the development of the legal 
framework for regulating the issue of the 
current study. The accumulated 
experience of the functioning of state 
authorities on the basis of such 
agreements is evaluated, and an opinion 
is expressed on maintaining the potential 
of this legal institution for improving 
federal relations. In addition, an opinion 
is expressed on the need to develop the 
correct and competent use of this 
mechanism, which will allow the best 
qualities of the domestic constitutional 
model to show and open up additional 
growth opportunities for individual 
regions. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the foundations of the 
constitutional system in Russia is the 
principle of federalism. According to 
part 3, Article 5 of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation, the federal structure 
of the Russian state includes, along with 
other signs, the division of jurisdiction 
and powers between the state authorities 
of the Russian Federation and state 
authorities of its constituent entities. At 
the same time, the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation enshrines a number 
of guarantees designed to ensure the 
subjects of the Russian Federation 
exercise their powers as much as 
possible within the framework of the 
constitutional concept of Russian 
federalism. These guarantees can be 
found in all chapters of the Russian 
Constitution, but now we will 
concentrate on those contained in the 
provisions included in the mentioned 
article of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, namely: 
- Equal rights of all subjects of 
the Russian Federation, regardless of 
their type, name, status and any other 
circumstances; 
- The constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation have their own 
constitution (for republics within the 
Russian Federation) or their charters (for 
all other constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation) and legislation; 
- The unity of the state power 
system, which ensures organizational 
and functional coherence of the federal 
and regional levels of government; 
- Equal rights and self-
determination of peoples in the Russian 
Federation, which also serves as a 
guideline for understanding the 
competence of state authorities, 
including the constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation. 
In addition, the equal rights of 
all the constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation to each other and in relations 
with federal state authorities are 
separately stipulated (part 4, article 5 of 
the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation ). In essence, this rule is a 
special case in relation to the general 
principle of equal rights for all subjects 
of the Russian Federation (part 1 of the 
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same article). However, despite the 
obvious semantic duplication of these 
legal provisions, the constitutional 
legislator, nevertheless, took such a step, 
realizing how important the sphere of 
relations between the federal centre and 
the subjects of the federation is. Without 
any exaggeration, it can be argued that 
the quality and conflict-free nature of 
these relations largely determine the 
maturity and development of Russian 
federalism, as well as the established 
system of checks [1] and balances, which 
allows for more effective interaction 
between the branches of state power. 
That is why the additional certainty and 
a kind of safety net in this matter, within 
the meaning of these constitutional 
norms, is by no means superfluous. 
  
2. Methods 
By the way, the authors of the 
Russian Constitution quite often used a 
similar method of legal technique. They 
did the same thing, for example, when 
creating norms prohibiting 
discrimination in all kinds of its 
manifestations. For example, article 19 
of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation twice in a row establishes the 
inadmissibility of discrimination on the 
grounds of social, racial, national, 
linguistic and religious affiliation (part 
2). The same applies to the double 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis 
of gender (parts 2 and 3). 
In both of the above cases (both 
with respect to federal relations and with 
regard to anti-discrimination standards, 
from the point of linguistics, this is a 
tautology, an unreasonable repetition of 
the same semantic construction, but from 
the point of view of jurisprudence, it is a 
completely justified additional measure 
aimed at more guaranteed to achieve the 
desired result namely, to prevent any 
discriminatory manifestations, 
especially where the existing legal 
experience suggests the presence of 
“bottlenecks”. And here it is hardly 
possible to reproach the constitutional 
legislator for taking special care of the 
additional protection of the rights and 
freedoms of man and citizen, in addition 
to protecting his/her inviolability and 
property [2], even if it does not fit into 
some canons of stylistically linguistic 
grace. 
The really serious omissions in 
the content of constitutional norms, 
which create considerable problems and 
difficulties in their implementation in 
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practice, look the more contrasting 
against the background of such a verified 
approach in terms of legal technology. In 
particular, this concerns such a sensitive 
issue as federal relations in the field of 
division of jurisdiction and powers 
between two levels of government. And, 
perhaps, the problem No. 1 in this list, in 
our opinion, is the frankly awkward 
nature of enshrining in the constitutional 
act of the scope of powers provided for 
the constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation. The authors of the Russian 
Constitution decided not to list the 
specific powers of the regions and 
thereby rendered innocuous the meaning 
of Article 73, formulating it “as a 
residual”: everything that was not 
included in the powers of the Russian 
Federation and the sphere of joint 
jurisdiction (Articles 71 and 72, 
respectively) then belongs to the subjects 
of the Russian Federation. The 
Constitution remains silent to a perfectly 
reasonable question: what exactly 
belongs to these powers, and what 
exactly they are (in the image and 
likeness of previous jurisdiction). Such a 
lack of understanding the norms of a key 
level has obvious negative consequences 
in terms of the implementation of these 
constitutional provisions. This led to the 
proposal of individual authors to amend 
article 73 of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation as soon as possible 
by enshrining it in an exhaustive list of 
powers of the Russian Federation 
constituent entities, while indicating that 
this gap, in principle, cannot be filled at 
the level of federal law [3]. 
  
3. Results And Discussion 
However, this constitutional 
flaw has its own explanation related to 
the socio-political and state-legal 
background that accompanied the birth 
of the new Russian Constitution. Here is 
how S.M. Shakhray recalls that period 
regarding work together with S.S. 
Alekseev on the text of the Constitution: 
“We managed to solve this dilemma by 
embarking on a legal trick: we simply 
came up with a synonymous replacement 
for the concept of “limited (distributed) 
sovereignty” adopted in constitutional 
and legal science [4]. 
Strictly speaking, the same 
motivation was laid in the foundation of 
Article 72 of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation, which led to a fairly 
strong growth of the objects belonging to 
joint jurisdiction of central and regional 
 Periódico do Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre Gênero e Direito 
Centro de Ciências Jurídicas - Universidade Federal da Paraíba 
V. 8 - Nº 06 - Ano 2019 – Special Edition 
ISSN | 2179-7137 | http://periodicos.ufpb.br/ojs2/index.php/ged/index 
 
363 
government bodies. This allows the 
federal authorities to put under greater 
control the activities of the Russian 
regions, including their legislative field, 
but significantly reduces the scope for 
the implementation of federal relations. 
Despite the fact that “legislation is the 
main source of law” [5], federal laws 
themselves often do not meet the 
mentioned constitutional criteria of 
“general issues”, “coordination” and 
“general principles”. A direct participant 
in the updating of the doctrine of Russian 
federalism is the first President of 
Tatarstan, and now the State Advisor to 
the Republic of Tatarstan M.Sh. 
Shaimiev outlined this problem as 
follows: “First of all, this applies to laws 
adopted at the federal level, and 
especially in the areas of joint 
jurisdiction of state bodies of the Russian 
Federation and constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation... This problem 
requires permanent legislative and 
contractual settlements. The adoption of 
federal laws raises many questions when 
a complete and clear legislative 
separation of powers does not occur. 
There are elements of an invasion in the 
exclusive powers of the federal 
subjects... We say “federal state” 
ourselves, and we create so many 
parallel structures that try to control 
almost all issues, even which air the 
region breathes, and so on ”[6 ]. Of 
course, with this approach, the federal 
nature of relations between the federal 
centre and the regions is more inclined 
towards unitarism. 
While stating this omission, it 
must be admitted that the Russian 
Constitution also contains mechanisms 
for its completion. These include, for 
example, securing the possibility of 
concluding agreements on the division of 
jurisdiction and powers between federal 
and regional government bodies (part 3, 
Article 11 of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation), the permissibility 
of that federal executive bodies on the 
basis of mutual agreements would 
transfer a part of their powers to 
executive authorities of the constituent 
entities of the Russian Federation and 
vice versa (parts 2 and 3, Article 78 of 
the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation) or the interpretative 
potential of the Constitution Court of the 
Russian Federation, in particular its 
power to give an interpretation of the 
Constitution (Part 5, Article 125 of the 
Constitution). Each of these 
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mechanisms, in principle, is able to 
compensate for the shortcomings of 
constitutional legal regulation and solve 
the problem we have indicated. 
But here new difficulties arise: 
these mechanisms either do not work, or 
they do not always work or not in full due 
to the scale of the problem. Consider, for 
example, the implementation of part 3, 
Article 11 of the Russian Constitution: 
the first agreement on the division of 
competence and power was concluded 
between the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Tatarstan on February 15, 
1994. The provisions of this Agreement 
reflected its compromise nature as a legal 
means of overcoming the contradictions 
in the view on federal relations from 
Moscow and Kazan that existed at that 
time. In it, as in the Constitution of 
Tatarstan dated November 6, 1992 (in its 
original version), there was no indication 
of the subjectivity of the republic within 
the Russian Federation. The status of 
Tatarstan was enshrined in Chapter 5, 
which, among other things, stipulated 
that Tatarstan “independently 
determines its state-legal status”, 
establishes equal Tatar [7] and Russian 
languages as its state languages, its laws 
shall prevail provided that they are 
consistent only with international 
obligations of the republic (article 59), 
its sovereign status, being a subject of 
international law associated with the 
Russian Federation on the basis of the 
Treaty on mutual delegation of authority 
and power (Article 61), enters into 
relations with other states and concludes 
international agreements (Article 62). 
Perhaps, the most resonant were the 
indicated provisions of Article 61, and 
the most controversial was the norm on 
associate membership with the Russian 
Federation. 
Of course, the description of the 
legal bond between Tatarstan and Russia 
by the formula of associated membership 
raised reasonable questions as to what 
exactly the Tatarstan Constitution 
understood by this term, since such a 
concept had not been encountered in the 
theory and practice of Russian 
federalism. This is how B.L. Zheleznov, 
one of the authors of the Tatarstan 
Constitution, characterizes the then 
status provisions of Article 61 of the 
Basic Law: “This formula implied an 
attempt to consolidate fundamentally 
new and special relations with the 
Russian Federation, which go beyond the 
framework of the Federal Treaty, contain 
 Periódico do Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre Gênero e Direito 
Centro de Ciências Jurídicas - Universidade Federal da Paraíba 
V. 8 - Nº 06 - Ano 2019 – Special Edition 
ISSN | 2179-7137 | http://periodicos.ufpb.br/ojs2/index.php/ged/index 
 
365 
features of both federal and confederate 
bonds, and supposedly do not destroy the 
integrity of the Russian Federation and, 
at the same time, do not violate the actual 
state sovereignty of the Republic of 
Tatarstan" [8]. 
It can be said that the concept of 
the associated membership of Tatarstan 
within the Russian Federation as a 
conscious alternative to the concept of 
the subject of the Russian Federation was 
at that time an attempt to find a legal 
formula for a socio-political 
compromise. Remembering the day 
parliament adopted the Constitution of 
the Republic of Tatarstan (November 6, 
1992), B.L. Zheleznov notes: “It was 
already 5 o’clock in the evening, 
everyone was tired, and a sea of people 
in green bandages was raging around the 
building. Then Shaimiev went to the 
podium and proposed to record not 
“united”, but “associated state”. This 
produced an effect: everyone understood 
this word to the best of their knowledge” 
[9]. As a result of this amendment, the 
new Constitution of Tatarstan was then 
adopted. The domestic legal doctrine, of 
course, noted the legal qualification of 
the special status of Tatarstan as an 
associate member and its most advanced 
interpretation of updating federal 
relations in the Russian Federation [10]. 
As you can see, the agreement 
on the delimitation of the subjects of 
competence and (mutual) delegation of 
authority was initially given the 
character of a status legal document 
reflecting the new nature of relations 
between the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Tatarstan. 
The beginning of a new 
procedure for the division of jurisdiction 
and powers between the federal centre 
and the regions was laid in connection 
with the adoption of the Federal Law 
dated June 24, 1999 No. 119-FZ “On the 
principles and procedure for the division 
of jurisdiction and powers between the 
state authorities of the Russian 
Federation and state authorities of the 
federal subjects of the Russian 
Federation." This Federal law not only 
stopped the tendency to conclude new 
similar agreements, but, in fact, qualified 
most of the already concluded 
agreements as illegitimate. Later, in June 
2001, President of the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin created the 
so-called “Kozak Commission” to study 
the question of the separation of powers 
between federal authorities and the 
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authorities of the constituent entities 
[11]. 
The next step in reforming this 
sphere of contractual relations was 
Federal Law No. 95-FZ dated July 4, 
2003, which amended and supplemented 
the Federal Law “On General Principles 
of Organization of Legislative 
(Representative) and Executive Bodies 
of State Power of the Subjects of the 
Russian Federation” dated 6 October 
1999, No. 184-FZ. The general meaning 
of the innovations was to strengthen the 
position of the federal centre and tighten 
the requirements for the division of 
jurisdiction and powers.  
Only Tatarstan succeeded in 
using the new procedure for delimiting 
powers between federal and regional 
government bodies, which resulted in the 
Agreement approved by the Federal Law 
dated July 24, 2007 No. 199-FZ. After 10 
years, on August 11, 2017, it ceased to 
be in force due to its expiration. As a 
result of this, currently in the Russian 
Federation there is no contractual 
relationship between the federal centre 
and a constituent entity of the Russian 
Federation on the division of jurisdiction 
and powers.  
  
4. Summary 
So, what now are the provisions 
of part 3, article 11 of the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation regarding 
agreements on the division of 
jurisdiction and powers, and, for 
example, article 26 in the Constitution of 
the Republic of Tatarstan, containing 
such a legal provision, if the practice of 
concluding and functioning of such 
agreements is completely eliminated? 
Does this type of contractual relationship 
have a legal potential and legal future, or 
have they completely “played back” 
their historical mission and retired? It is 
still a question of higher order norms, the 
constitutional space of Russia and its 
subjects. To answer these and similar 
questions, it is necessary, first of all, to 
determine what benefits the contractual 
mechanism for the differentiation of 
powers can bring. In our opinion, this 
mechanism has a future. 
The history of its appearance 
and relevance presented here 
schematically as an instrument for 
overcoming contradictions in the sphere 
of federal relations testifies in favour of 
the fact that it may well be needed later. 
This tool gives some elasticity to Russian 
federalism, allows for precise and 
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accurate provision of additional powers 
to individual subjects of the Russian 
Federation or reconfiguration of the 
general model for the needs of such 
regions that are objective and justified in 
terms of managerial effectiveness. It is 
not by chance that in domestic legal 
science, the idea is expressed that any 
federal relations are contractual by their 
legal nature, moreover, they do not 
always appear as such in this form, but 
they are always such in essence. 
Let us make such an assumption 
that it is too early to dismiss the 
contractual mechanism of the Russian 
federalism. On the contrary, with proper 
and competent use, this mechanism is an 
advantage of our constitutional model, 
which opens up (even if not on an on-
going basis, but at certain points) 
additional legal levers for the 
development of those regions that can 
really move faster than the general 
“flow” of subjects of the Russian 
Federation. 
  
5. Conclusions 
The contractual mechanism for 
the delimitation of jurisdiction and 
authority between federal and regional 
government bodies has already shown its 
effectiveness as a means of harmonizing 
federal relations in the Russian 
Federation, provided it is well-founded. 
Its potential may well be in demand in 
the future. 
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